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NOTE
Boot-Strapping Trans-Discrimination
Claims to Sex: Band-Aiding the
Discrimination of Transgender People
R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420 (Mo.
2019) (en banc).
Zachary Walker*

I. INTRODUCTION
R.M.A. was discriminated against merely because he identified as a
male.1 He was denied use of basic school facilities that are available to all
other boys his age.2 Under some federal and state laws, R.M.A. would be
fully protected from such discrimination.3 In Missouri, however,
transgender individuals are not expressly recognized as a protected class.4
Thus, until Missouri establishes safeguards for people who are
discriminated against because of their transgender identity, R.M.A. and
other transgender children must couch their claims as discrimination on
the basis of “sex.”5
In Missouri, claims of discrimination may only be brought under one
of the five protected classes listed in the Missouri Human Rights Act

*

B.A., University of Central Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of MissouriColumbia School of Law, 2023; Associate Editor 2022–2023, Associate Member
2021–2022, Missouri Law Review. I would like to thank Professor Rigel Oliveri for
her insight and expertise in discrimination law. I would also like to thank Luke A.
Hawley for his comments and edits of this Note. Finally, I would like to thank the
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1
R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 424
(Mo. 2019) (en banc).
2
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2017); see discussion infra Part III.B.
3
See MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(6) (2017).
4
R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 430 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
5
Id. at 427.
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(“MHRA”).6 The five protected classes are “race. . . religion, national
origin, sex, . . . [and] disability.”7 This leaves transgender people
vulnerable to discrimination. The Supreme Court of Missouri attempted
to alleviate this problem in R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-VI
School District.8 However, rather than holding that claims of transgender
discrimination are protected under the MHRA, the court put a Band-Aid
on the issue.9
This Note brings to light the injustice that is being swept under the
rug by the court’s failure to recognize that the word “sex” lacks legal
protections for transgender individuals in Missouri. Part II summarizes
the underlying facts and holding of R.M.A. Part III discusses the
background of the MHRA and its interplay with the meaning of “sex,”
including a brief overview of the differences between transgenderism,
gender identity, sexual orientation, and sex. Part IV dissects the rationale
of the majority and dissenting opinions with a brief look at a subsequent
United States Supreme Court case discussing transgender
discrimination.10 Lastly, Part V examines the implications of R.M.A. and
four possible solutions that the Supreme Court of Missouri can adopt to
more adequately provide legal protection against transgender
discrimination.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
R.M.A. attended Delta Woods Middle School.11 He classified his
legal sex as male.12 While attending Delta Woods, he attempted to use
both the boys’ restroom and locker room.13 However, the Blue Springs
School District and their Board of Education (“Defendants”) denied
R.M.A. access to such facilities due to Defendants’ belief that R.M.A. had
female genitalia.14 R.M.A. filed a complaint with the Missouri
Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) against Defendants for
sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation under the MHRA.15
6

See infra Part III.B.
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065 (2017).
8
568 S.W.3d at 427.
9
Id. at 428–29.
10
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
11
R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 426.
12
Id. at 424.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 424, 431 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
15
Id. at 424. The purpose of the MHRA is to prohibit “discrimination because
of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment,
7
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The Commission issued a right to sue, but R.M.A. unsuccessfully
petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus.16 R.M.A. next brought suit
against Defendants in a Missouri circuit court.17 Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the court sustained without
explanation.18 R.M.A.’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri
followed.19
Defendants moved to dismiss on two grounds.20 First, Defendants
argued that “the MHRA does not cover claims based on gender identity.”21
Second, Defendants argued that schools and school districts are not
“persons” as defined by Section 213.010 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes.22 Thus, according to the Defendants, R.M.A. did not state a claim
under the MHRA.23 The Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed, holding
instead that R.M.A. stated a valid claim because he properly pled the
following elements of the MHRA:
(1) Plaintiff is a member of a class protected by Section 213.065;
(2) Plaintiff was discriminated against in the use of a public
accommodation (as defined by Section 213.010); and
(3) Plaintiff’s status as a member of a protected class was a
contributing factor in that discrimination. 24

disability, or familial status as it relates to housing . . . ,” including protecting
discrimination as it related to public accommodation. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(6)
(2017).
16
R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 424. A writ of mandamus is “a writ
issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by a lower court or
governmental officer or body.” Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
17
R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 424.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. A motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a claim requires an
examination of R.M.A.’s petition, assuming all “properly pleaded facts” as true while
simultaneously reading all allegations in favor of R.M.A. Id. As long as R.M.A.’s
accepted facts are sufficient to state a claim the Defendants’ motion will be vacated.
Id.
24
Id. at 425 (citing Midstate Oil Co., Inc. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 679
S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)).
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First, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that R.M.A. sufficiently pled
that he was denied “‘full and equal use and enjoyment’ of a public
accommodation” because Defendants denied him access to the boys’
restroom and locker room.25 Second, R.M.A. sufficiently pled that he
belonged to a protected class by stating that his legal sex is male.26 Third,
R.M.A. sufficiently pled that the discrimination that occurred due to his
sex was a direct and proximate cause of his damages.27 Accepting all pled
facts as true, the court found that R.M.A. sufficiently established facts that
could lead a reasonable jury to find and return a verdict for Plaintiff.28

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
With the rise in differences in gender identities and expressions,
courts have split on how to handle transgender discrimination without
explicit statutory protection. R.M.A. represents a trend in protecting the
rights of transgender individuals via various human rights statutes and
cases.29 In deciding this case, the court faced a variety of background
considerations, including: (1) the traditionally misunderstood differences
between sex and gender concepts,30 (2) previous sex discrimination claims
under the MHRA and how the statute has been interpreted in those
instances,31 (3) other state and federal protections provided to transgender
persons,32 and (4) the interpretation of statutes similar to the MHRA.33

A. Background of Transgenderism and Gender Identity
Defining the concepts of sex, sexual orientation, gender, and gender
identity is paramount to understanding the basis of R.M.A.’s claim, yet
these concepts are often confusing and mistakenly interchanged.34 In
general, sex refers to the biological and physical traits that distinguish

25

Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
27
Id. at 428–29.
28
Id. at 425.
29
See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
30
See R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 425 nn. 7–10.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 428.
33
Id. at 429.
34
See, e.g., Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2015).
26
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males, females, and intersex persons.35 Sexual orientation refers to the sex
of persons to whom one is attracted, which is where terms such as gay,
lesbian, and bisexual stem from.36 Gender is the condition of maleness or
femaleness determined by “attitudes, feelings and behaviors that a given
culture associates with a person’s biological sex.”37 Lastly, gender identity
is the identification of one’s self as male or female.38
Where does transgenderism fit into this dichotomy? A transgender
person is one whose “assigned biological sex [does not] match their felt
identity.”39 For example, a person may have been assigned female at birth,
as R.M.A. was, but his felt gender identity is that of a male. A transgender
person may even express his gender as a male by adopting traits that his
culture associates more with “maleness.”40 While the terms “trans” and
“transgender” are relatively new,41 nonbinary persons have existed for
Am. Psych. Ass’n, Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Diversity in APA Documents, APA, https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexualitydefinitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYZ5-PW3X] (last visited Apr. 25, 2022). Intersex
refers to “[a] person whose reproductive system has characteristics of both males and
females . . ., with some cells that possess XX chromosomes and others that are XY.”
Intersex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
36
Am. Psych. Ass’n, supra note 35, at 6.
37
Id. at 2.
38
Id. at 4. For those of us who have never had to question whether our felt gender
identity is in conflict with that of our biological sex, this may seem confusing. Gender
identity is a feeling that one has, not an external expression to be perceived by others.
Id. A person who has a gender identity of a man, but was born a female, may
experience distress and identity issues. Id. at 2–3. However, this is nonetheless a
recorded and understood phenomena that occurs to a small section of the population.
ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE
UNITED
STATES?
2
(2016),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Trans-Adults-US-Aug-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SF89-FV7T]
(finding 0.6% of U.S. adults identify as transgender).
39
Am. Psych. Ass’n, supra note 35, at 7. Why some individuals experience the
feeling of another gender that is different than their biological self is still not fully
understood. Am. Psych. Ass’n, Trangender People, Gender Identity and Gender
Expression,
APA
(2014),
https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbtq/transgender
[https://perma.cc/LM7B-669U]. It could be a variety of factors, such as biological
differences in the genetic makeup of an individual, different forms of the brain
matching closer to the opposite sex, environmental pressures, or a combination of
factors. Id.
40
For example, a transgender man in the United States may cut his hair shorter,
grow out other body hair, or wear clothes in a “manly” style to express a gender trait(s)
that is commonly associated with men.
41
See Genny Beemyn, Transgender History in the United States, TRANS BODIES,
TRANS SELVES 28 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014), https://www.umass.edu/
stonewall/sites/default/files/Infoforandabout/transpeople/genny_beemyn_transgende
35
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much of written human history.42 Even within the United States,
transgenderism is not new.43 However, transgender people have
historically been disenfranchised and continue to face hardships that
legislation such as the MHRA was designed to protect.44

r_history_in_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UBW-3HXP] (“A larger rights
movement also grew significantly in the 1990s, facilitated by the increasing use of the
term ‘transgender’ to encompass all individuals whose gender identity or expression
differs from the social norms of the gender assigned to them at birth. This wider
application of ‘transgender’ developed among writers and activists beginning the mid
1980s and started to catch on more widely in the early 1990s.”); see also Stephen
Whittle, A Brief History of Transgender Issues, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2010),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/jun/02/brief-history-transgenderissues [https://perma.cc/U2A8-9GKA] (“‘Transvestite’ originated in 1910 from the
German sexologist Magnus Hirschfield who would later develop the Berlin Institute
where the very first ‘sex change’ operations took place. ‘Transsexual’ was not coined
until 1949, ‘transgender’ not until 1971, and ‘trans’ (a very British term) not until
1996.”).
42
See e.g., Hinduism Case Study–Gender, HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL
RELIGIOUS LITERACY PROJECT, (2018), https://hwpi.harvard.edu/files/rpl/files/
gender_hinduism.pdf?m=1597338930 [https://perma.cc/X24W-2K7Z] (“[I]n Hindu
society, people of non-binary gender expression have played important roles for over
2000 years. Called the third gender, evidence for their existence in Hindu society can
be found in Hindu holy texts like the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, where Hindu
hero Arjuna becomes the third gender. Third gender people have often been revered
throughout South Asian history; for example, Muslim rulers of the Mughal Empire in
the 15th to 19th centuries were generous patrons of third gender Indians.”); Walter L.
Williams, The ‘Two-Spirit’ People of Indigenous North Americans, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2010/oct/11/two-spirit-peoplenorth-america [https://perma.cc/P8QK-SWDV] (“Native Americans have often held
intersex, androgynous people, feminine males and masculine females in high
respect. The most common term to define such persons today is to refer to them as
‘two-spirit’ people, but in the past feminine males were sometimes referred to as
‘berdache’ by early French explorers in North America, who adapted a Persian word
‘bardaj’, meaning an intimate male friend.”). It is important to note that these ideas
and interpretations of gender and sex are not the same as what we think of
transgenderism in western culture today.
43
See Opinion, Milestones in the American Transgender Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/15/opinion/editorialtransgender-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/6A75-T7W2].
44
Rose Gilroy et al., Transgender Rights and Issues, 22 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
417, 419 (2021) (citing Kiara Brantley Jones et al., Black Trans Lives Matter: Activists
Call for Inclusion in Racial Justice Movement, ABC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/black-trans-lives-matter-activists-call-inclusionracial/story?id=73571954 [https://perma.cc/H6TT-GWF8]).
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B. The Missouri Human Rights Act and “Sex”
Enacted in 1957, the MHRA initially only barred discrimination
based upon “race or national ancestry.”45 At the same time, the Missouri
General Assembly established the Commission “to encourage fair
treatment . . . foster mutual understanding and respect . . . and discourage
discrimination . . . .”46 After being amended over the years, the MHRA
now prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, national
origin, ancestry, [and] sex.”47 This statute codified a cause of action for
those who experience discrimination in housing,48 loans,49 employment,50
public accommodations,51 and other areas.52
Before R.M.A., transgender persons and other lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and queer (“LGBTQ”) groups were not afforded express protection under
the MHRA because Missouri courts had construed “sex” to exclude sexual
orientation, gender identity, and transgenderism.53 Instead, Missouri
courts have interpreted the word “sex” to concern only a person’s
biological distinctions.54 For example, in Pittman v. Cook Paper
Recycling Corp., the plaintiff alleged discrimination based on sexual
orientation.55 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the term “sex”
within the MHRA is unambiguous and requires a “clear meaning”
interpretation.56 The court determined that the clear meaning of the word
“sex” is “a person’s gender and has nothing to do with sexual
orientation.”57 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff’s pleadings did not
state a sufficient cause of action because sexual orientation was not
covered under the term “sex” in the MHRA.58
45

MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (1959).
Id. § 213.020.2 (2016).
47
Id. § 213.010(6) (2017).
48
See id. § 213.040 (describing prohibited conduct). See also id. §§ 213.075,
213.076, 213.111 (establishing cause of action for engaging in prohibited conduct
under MHRA).
49
Id. § 213.045.
50
Id. § 213.055.
51
Id. § 213.060.
52
Id. § 213.070.
53
See Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2015) (“The clear meaning prohibiting discrimination based upon ‘sex’ . . .
concerns discrimination based upon a person's gender. . . .”).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 481.
56
Id. at 482.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 482–83.
46
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Because Missouri has interpreted “sex” discrimination as requiring
some discrimination based on a person’s gender – thereby conflating
gender with sex – pleadings must relate to some gender trait or the
biological sex itself to create a sufficient cause of action.59 In Lampley v.
Missouri Commission on Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Missouri
recognized that claims of sex stereotyping – presumably related to sexual
orientation – are valid allegations of "sex” discrimination under the
MHRA.60 The plaintiff in Lampley, a homosexual male, brought suit
against his employer for sex discrimination.61 The court distinguished the
case from Pittman based on how the plaintiff pled his protected class.62
While the plaintiff in Pittman pled a hostile work environment based on
“sexual orientation,”63 the plaintiff in Lampley alleged he was
“discriminated against on the basis of sex because [he] did not conform to
generally held sexual stereotypes.”64 According to the court, the fact that
the plaintiff was gay was only “incidental to the basis for the
discrimination.”65 The court reasoned that the alleged discrimination, as
pleaded, actually stemmed from the fact that the plaintiff did “not exhibit
the stereotypical attributes of how a male should appear and behave.”66
The court’s holding suggests that individuals discriminated against based
on their sexual orientation may still have sufficient causes of action if they
disguise the claim as a valid allegation of sex discrimination under the
MHRA.67
Other jurisdictions have largely agreed with this rationale,68 which
originated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.69 In Hopkins, the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized that sex discrimination may occur
when an employer relies upon sex stereotypes in its employment

59
See Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 23–24 (Mo.
2019) (en banc).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 19.
62
See id. at 23.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 24.
67
Id. at 25.
68
See generally Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir.
2017); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins]
applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too
feminine.”).
69
490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
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decisions.70 The Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the
discrimination stemmed from the employer’s view that women must act a
certain way and the woman in question diverted from that norm.71 The
Court held that discrimination based on a diversion from sex social norms
violated Title VII.72
As Pittman and Lampley demonstrate, two similarly situated
plaintiffs may obtain different pre-trial results depending solely on how
they pled their discrimination.73 In Missouri, as long as one ties the
discrimination – whether based on gender identity or sexual orientation –
to the court’s interpretation of gender or biological sex, the court is likely
to find that the requirement of sex discrimination is met.74

C. Other State and Federal Protections
Although the MHRA’s definition of “sex” is confined to rudimentary
concepts of gender and sex, other states have explicit protections for
transgender people.75 For example, Illinois has codified “gender-related
identity whether or not traditionally associated with the person’s
designated sex at birth” into its definition of “sexual orientation.”76
Because Illinois’ statute explicitly includes gender identity, its human
rights act “protects transgender individuals even though gender identity is
not explicitly listed as a prohibited basis for discrimination.”77 Like

70
Id. (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”).
71
Id. at 255.
72
Id. at 250–51.
73
Compare Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp. 478 S.W.3d 479, 482–83
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (dismissing sex discrimination claim because it pled
discrimination based on sexual orientation) with Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum.
Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (pleadings of sex stereotyping
sufficiently allege sex discrimination); see generally supra notes 55–67 and
accompanying text.
74
See Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Mo. 2019)
(en banc).
75
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAWS THAT
PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 3–4 (2010),
https://www.nclrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/StateLawsThatProhibitDiscri
minationAgainstTransPeople.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM6F-L7VY] (finding that
fifteen states and the District of Columbia had statutes prohibiting discrimination in
employment, public accommodations, housing, credit, or schooling).
76
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103 (2021).
77
Ellen Henrion, Note, What's Missing? Addressing the Inadequate LGBT
Protections in the Missouri Human Rights Act, 81 MO. L. REV. 1173, 1179–80 (2016).
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Illinois, California has broad protections for LGBTQ people too.78 The
California statute explicitly separates “sex, gender, gender identity, gender
expression, . . . [and] sexual orientation . . . .”79
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock
v. Clay County,80 federal anti-discrimination statutes have also afforded
protections for both transgender identity and sexual orientation by
allowing plaintiffs to bootstrap their claim under “gender stereotyping”81
or tie the claim specifically to the narrowly defined class. As mentioned
above, the Hopkins Court first outlined this argument when it held that
discrimination against members of the LGBTQ community necessarily
relies on a person’s sex because such discrimination stems from the
common understanding of stereotypical characteristics of males and
females.82 This has been adopted in Missouri, as seen in Lampley.83 The
large disparity in the interpretation of discrimination statutes appears to
stem from the conflation of sex, sexual orientation, gender, and the like.

D. Statutory Interpretation
The objective of statutory interpretation is to “give effect to
legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.”84
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, “courts must give effect
to the language used by the legislature.”85 The text of a statute is
ambiguous “only if its language is subject to more than one reasonable

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (2021).
Id. This is different from the Illinois statute, which does not explicitly separate
them within the statute but instead simply includes “gender identity” under its explicit
protection of “sexual orientation.”
80
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
81
See Henrion, supra note 77, at 1181–82.
82
See infra Part III.B.
83
Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 25 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc) (“[A]n employee who suffers an adverse employment decision based on sexbased stereotypical attitudes of how a member of the employee's sex should act can
support an inference of unlawful sex discrimination. Sexual orientation is incidental
and irrelevant to sex stereotyping. Sex discrimination is discrimination, it is prohibited
by the Act, and an employee may demonstrate this discrimination through evidence
of sexual stereotyping.”).
84
Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015) (quoting Crawford v. Div. of Emp't Sec., 376 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Mo. 2012) (en
banc)).
85
Id. at 482 (quoting Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Prods., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 622,
624 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).
78
79
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interpretation.”86 Necessarily, a statute is unambiguous when “a person of
ordinary intelligence would find its meaning plain and clear.”87 Where the
term is not defined in the statute, Missouri courts use the “plain and
ordinary meaning” that may be derived from a dictionary.88 When the
term is ambiguous and not defined, courts use different canons to
determine the legislature’s intent.89
The MHRA is a remedial statute.90 Remedial statutes are “construed
liberally to include those cases which are within the spirit of the law and
all reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the
case” when ambiguity exists.91 “When it is uncertain whether a remedial
statute applies [to a specific case], courts resolve the ambiguity in favor”
of applying the statute to the injury.92 When a claimant seeks protection
under an MHRA class that is open to multiple interpretations, but is also
within the spirit of the law, the court should apply the MHRA because it
is a remedial statute.
The MHRA is considered “coextensive, but not identical” to its
federal counterparts.93 If the language in the MHRA is clear and
unambiguous, a federal law to the contrary is not binding.94 When
Missouri courts review MHRA cases, they are “guided by both Missouri
law and any federal . . . discrimination . . . case law that is consistent with
Missouri law.”95 Although Missouri follows the Hopkins sex-stereotype
rationale to broaden the MHRA’s protections,96 it still leaves vulnerable
groups without adequate human rights protections unless they cleverly
plead their discrimination claim.

86

Matthew Davis, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. 1127,
1129 (2016) (internal citations removed).
87
Id.
88
Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
89
Davis, supra note 86, at 1129.
90
Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc) (citing Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Mo. 2011) (en
banc)). A remedial statute is a statute that provides “a means to enforce rights or
redress injuries.” Remedial Statute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
91
State ex rel. Ford v. Wennskay, 824 S.W. 2d 99, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
92
Davis, supra note 86, at 11432.
93
Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(emphasis omitted).
94
Id. at 113.
95
Lampley, 570 S.W.3d at 22 (quoting Diaz v. Autozoners, LLC, 484 S.W.3d
64, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015)).
96
See infra Part III.B.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The crux of the case turned on whether “sex,” as covered by the
MHRA, includes transgenderism.97 The majority examined similar cases
from Missouri and other federal circuits before ultimately ruling that
R.M.A. sufficiently pled that he was a member of a protected class under
the MHRA because he stated that his “legal sex is male” in his complaint.98
This holding gives transgender persons some course for relief, but only if
the discrimination claim is properly pled.

A. Judge Wilson’s Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by now Chief Justice Paul C. Wilson,
described R.M.A.’s case as “simple and straightforward.”99 First, Chief
Justice Wilson acknowledged that the court may only reverse the motion
to dismiss if it found that R.M.A. sufficiently pled all facts required to
meet the elements of the cause of action.100
The elements of R.M.A.’s public accommodation sex discrimination
claim are as follows:
(1) Defendants denied Plaintiff the full and equal use and enjoyment
of a public accommodation;
(2) Plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
(3) Plaintiff’s sex was a contributing factor in the denial of his use of
a public accommodation; and
(4) Plaintiff suffered damages due to Defendants’ conduct. 101

Accepting R.M.A.’s allegations as true, the majority concluded that R.M.A.
met the requirements of a sufficient petition.102 Specifically, the court
determined R.M.A. adequately pled the four requisite facts needed to prove
his claim: (1) Defendants denied R.M.A. full and equal use and enjoyment of
a locker room and bathroom; (2) R.M.A. was a member of a protected class
because he pled his “legal sex is male;” (3) R.M.A.’s sex was a motivating
97

R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 430
(Mo. 2019) (en banc) (Fischer, J., dissenting).
98
Id. at 427.
99
Id. at 426.
100
Id. at 424.
101
Id. at 426–27.
102
Id. at 426–28.
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factor in his denial of locker room and bathroom use because he pled the
discrimination was on “grounds of his sex;” and (4) R.M.A. pled that he
suffered damages because he was denied use of the public accommodation.103
Although the majority spent little time discussing whether R.M.A.
was a member of a protected class, it analogized the case to Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut –104 a Fourth Circuit decision – which held that a plaintiff
sufficiently pled the elements of his claim where he alleged he was
discriminated against because of his sex.105 The Fourth Circuit made clear
that even if there is discrimination on the basis of a plaintiff’s sexual
orientation, a cause of action will lie “as long as the employee’s sex was a
cause of the discrimination.”106 Applying the Fourth Circuit’s approach,
the R.M.A. court held that even if there was discrimination against R.M.A.
because of his transgender status, he still sufficiently alleged that he was a
member of a protected class because he pled discrimination due to his
“legal sex” as a male.107

B. Judge Fischer’s Dissent
Judge Fischer focused on the fact that the MHRA does not facially
recognize allegations of gender identity discrimination.108 Judge Fischer
contended that the majority took only some of R.M.A.’s facts as true and
ignored a principal allegation that R.M.A was born a female who then
transitioned to a male.109 Judge Fischer pointed out that, “[t]aking all of
[his] allegations as true,” R.M.A. alleged that the Defendants

103

Id. at 426–28.
Id. at 428. The court said when comparing R.M.A.’s claim to the elements
pled in Wrightson, “The same is true here. R.M.A.’s petition alleges he is a member
of a protected class, he was discriminated against in the use of a public
accommodation, his status as a member of a protected class was the basis for the
discrimination he suffered, and he sustained damages, as required by section
213.065.” Id.
105
Id. The Fourth Circuit held that “while it is true Title VII does not afford a
cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual orientation, Wrightson does not
allege that he was discriminated against because he is heterosexual.” Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996). Instead, Wrightson alleged
he was “discriminated against because of his sex, male.” Id. The Fourth Circuit said
that for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, alleging Wrightson was discriminated
against “because of his sex” must be accepted as true, and thus is sufficient to
withstand dismissal. Id.
106
Id. at 144.
107
R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 427–29.
108
Id. at 430–34 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
109
Id. at 431.
104
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discriminated against him when they denied him access to the restroom
and locker room because of his transgender identity.110 Therefore, Judge
Fischer argued the majority incorrectly extended the protections of the
MHRA “beyond biological sex” to claims of transgender
discrimination.111
Judge Fischer next discussed what the MHRA is intended to
protect.112 The MHRA prohibits discrimination on “grounds of . . . sex.”113
Judge Fischer noted that the court should use the “plain and ordinary
meaning” of the word “sex” because the legislature did not define the
term114 Using a 1993 dictionary, Judge Fischer probed several possible
definitions of the word “sex”:
The word “sex” means “one of the two divisions of [organisms] esp.
human beings respectively designated male or female.” It also means
the “sum of morphological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities
of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction with its
concomitant genetic segregation and recombination ... that is typically
manifested as maleness or femaleness.” Additionally, the word “sex”
refers to “the sphere of interpersonal behavior esp. between male and
female,” the “phenomena of sexual instincts and their manifestations,”
and “determin[ing] the sex of an organic being.” 115

Using these possible definitions of “sex,” his dissent concluded that the
definition necessarily refers to a biological classification of people as
“male or female.”116 Thus, according to Judge Fischer, the majority was
precluded from interpreting “sex” to cover transgender status.117 Under
this analysis, R.M.A. failed to state a claim sufficient to survive
Defendants’ motion to dismiss because R.M.A. failed to allege he was part
of a protected class.118

110

Id.
Id.
112
Id. at 431–32.
113
Id. at 431 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065(2) (2017).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 431–32 (citing Sex, WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3ed.
1993)).
116
Id. at 432.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 433–34.
111
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V. COMMENT
R.M.A. may be seen as both a good and bad outcome for individuals
seeking justice for transgender discrimination. The good news is that this
opinion gives transgender persons some ground to, at the very least, get
their foot in the door of a courtroom. The bad news is that transgender
persons must bootstrap the true reasoning of discrimination – their
transgender status – to grounds related to sex. The court’s holding
ultimately fell short in its attempt to address the lack of legal protection
for transgender individuals. While the court had multiple avenues
available to adequately address the issue, it adopted an approach that will
force transgender individuals to couch their claims in “sex” rather than the
true root of the discrimination. In addition to several arguments that the
MHRA protects against gender identity discrimination, a subsequent
United States Supreme Court decision offers a solution for Missouri courts
to apply in future transgender discrimination cases.

A. Bootstrapping Claims Under Sex and Sex Stereotyping
R.M.A. gives transgender persons a way to claim discrimination
under the MHRA so long as they plead correctly. As previously noted, the
majority concluded that, because R.M.A. pled his “legal sex is male,”119
he sufficiently met that element needed to prove his claim.120 If R.M.A.
never pled that the discrimination occurred due to his “legal sex,” the
motion to dismiss most likely would have been upheld because the
majority and dissent both acknowledged that transgender status is not
explicitly protected under the MHRA.121 Therefore, if a transgender
person seeks protection because they were discriminated against on the
grounds of their transgender status, they must bootstrap their claims to
gender or biological sex.
There are a number of ways in which the Supreme Court of Missouri
can find that transgender discrimination is already protected under the
MHRA. First, the court could reason that the Missouri legislature intended
the word “sex” to include transgender status. While it is unlikely that the
Missouri legislature intended for transgender persons to be included in the
protections of the MHRA,122 the United States Supreme Court still found
119

Id. at 427.
Id.
121
Id. at 427. The court points to the fact that R.M.A. pled the discrimination
occurred because of his sex. Id. at 431.
122
See, e.g., Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2015) (“The clear meaning prohibiting discrimination based upon “sex”
120
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transgender discrimination to be a violation of Title VII in Bostock,123
despite the fact that Congress did not intend for transgender status to be
included in the Act.124 Because the Missouri legislature chose not to define
“sex,” Missouri courts have some leeway to argue transgender persons
may be protected on different grounds.
Second, the court could extend the Lampley reasoning to find that
transgender discrimination is protected under the current text of the
MHRA.125 Under this theory, discrimination based on sexual orientation
– or in R.M.A.’s case, gender identity – occurs by “sexual stereotyping.”126
Jurisdictions that follow the sexual stereotyping rationale argue that the
discrimination occurs not because of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, but
because the discriminator is influenced by prevalent stereotypes about
how members of each sex should act.127 Such discrimination would not
have occurred “but for the victim’s sex,” and thus the discrimination is
necessarily on the basis of “sex.”128 The R.M.A. court could have extended
this rationale to establish that discrimination on the basis of gender identity
is inherently discrimination on the basis of “sex.”

B. Favoring a Broadened Definition of “Sex”
Judge Fischer followed the traditional interpretation of the MHRA to
conclude that it only protects against discrimination based on biological

under the Missouri Human Rights Act intended by the Missouri legislature concerns
discrimination based upon a person's gender and has nothing to do with sexual
orientation.”).
123
Id. at 1739 (even assuming that sex meant “biological distinctions between
male and female,” the Court still found Title VII to protect transgender
discrimination).
124
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1752 (2020) (“[The] initial
proponent of the sex discrimination rule in Title VII, [was] Representative Howard
Smith. On some accounts, the congressman may have wanted or at least was
indifferent to the possibility of) broad language with wide-ranging effect. Not
necessarily because he was interested in rooting out sex discrimination in all its forms,
but because he may have hoped to scuttle the whole Civil Rights Act and thought that
adding language covering sex discrimination would serve as a poison pill.”).
125
See generally Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16 (Mo.
2019) (en banc).
126
See, e.g., id.; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Lewis v.
Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 2010).
127
See, e.g., Lampley, 570 S.W.3d 16; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1040 (8th Cir. 2010).
128
Lampley, 570 S.W.3d at 24 (citing Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1040) (internal
emphasis omitted).
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sex.129 He argued that “sex” is unambiguous, and therefore the court
should read the plain and ordinary meaning of the word.130 In discussing
the proper definition of the word “sex,” Judge Fischer listed two separate
definitions131 and concluded that both must be referring to biological
sex.132 However, those definitions themselves show that the word “sex”
is actually ambiguous. While one definition provided the classic “male or
female” dichotomy,133 the other definition of “sex” was substantially
different: the “sum of morphological, physiological, and behavioral
peculiarities . . . that is typically manifested as maleness or femaleness.”134
The second definition moves far past the traditional “male or female”
understanding and expands “sex” to encompass the physiology and
behavior of a person as well—“typically manifested as maleness or
femaleness.”135 Furthermore, physiological and behavioral aspects of a
person align more with the definition of gender than sex, which Judge
Fischer mistakenly used interchangeably throughout his analysis.136 These
definitions support arguments that either (1) “sex” is ambiguous because
it has more than one reasonable interpretation, and therefore it should be
read in favor of situations that are within the spirit of the MHRA,137 or (2)
the plain meaning of “sex” is something more than the biological
separation of the male and female.
These exact definitions were also stated by Judge Gabbert in his
dissent in Pittman.138 However, Judge Fischer and Judge Gabbert came to
opposite conclusions.139 Judge Fischer argued that those definitions refer
only to the biological separation of male and female, while Judge Gabbert
argued those definitions are more expansive. Looking at the definitions
above, Judge Gabbert came to the correct conclusion that “sex does not

129

R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 430
(Mo. 2019) (en banc) (Fischer, J., dissenting).
130
Id. at 432.
131
Id. at 431–32.
132
Id. at 432.
133
Id. at 431.
134
Id. at 431–32 (emphasis added).
135
Id.
136
See supra Part III.A.
137
See supra Part III.D.
138
Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 486 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015) (Gabbert, J., dissenting).
139
R.M.A., 568 S.W.3d at 430 (Fischer, J., dissenting); Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at
489 (Gabbert, J., dissenting).
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include only gender” because the definition includes the “morphological,
physiological, and behavioral” aspects of sex.140
Under Judge Gabbert’s argument, if the plain and ordinary meaning
of “sex” encompasses more than just gender or biological sex, there is an
argument that transgender individuals fit within the definition of “sex” that
takes into account “morphological, physiological, and behavioral”
characteristics.141 If that is the case, a plain interpretation of the MHRA
would include transgenderism.
On the other hand, one may conclude that there are multiple
reasonable interpretations of “sex.” If this is the case, courts may look to
canons of interpretation or other sources, such as federal guidance, of the
legislature’s intent.142 The MHRA is a remedial statute and is interpreted
to include situations that fit within the “spirit of the law.”143 The spirit of
the MHRA is to protect against discrimination.144 The transgender
community is a group that has been historically discriminated against.
Therefore, any ambiguity of the word “sex,” the MHRA’s status as a
remedial statute, and federal guidance such as Bostock support the finding
that transgender individuals are already protected under the MHRA.

C. Applying Bostock
One year after the R.M.A opinion, the Supreme Court of the United
States heard Bostock v. Clayton County.145 There, three suits were
consolidated into one because they all had the same question: whether sex
discrimination under Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or transgender status.146 All parties to the suit agreed
that Title VII is violated by intentional discrimination on grounds of sex.147
The Court held that because sexual orientation or gender identity
discrimination necessarily requires discrimination based on the
140

Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 486 (Gabbert, J., dissenting).
See supra Part III.A; R.M.A. by Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 431–32; Pittman,
478 S.W.3d at 486. A transgender person is one whose “assigned biological sex
doesn’t match their felt identity.” Using the broad concepts of “morphological,
physiological, and behavioral” concepts listed in one of the definitions provided of
“sex,” transgender individuals would surely fit within the physiological and
behavioral aspects.
142
See supra Part III.D.
143
Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc).
144
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.020.2 (2016).
145
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
146
Id. at 1737.
147
Id. at 1734.
141
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individual’s sex, intentional discrimination on such grounds violated Title
VII.148 The Court reasoned that a person’s sex is a necessary “but-for
cause” in discrimination based on that person’s sexual orientation or
transgender status.149 Although Bostock is not binding upon Missouri
because Title VII only applies to the federal government, Missouri courts
often seek guidance from federal statutes when a Missouri statute is
ambiguous or has a similar interpretation as a federal law.150
The Bostock Court’s reasoning may be the most straightforward
argument in favor of protecting transgender persons under the MHRA.
The United States Supreme Court interpreted “sex” to mean exactly what
the Defendants and dissent in R.M.A. wanted it to mean: “biological
distinctions between male and female.”151 However, Bostock held that
where a defendant “intentionally relies in part on an individual[’s] . . . sex
when deciding to discharge” that individual from their employment, a Title
VII violation has occurred.152 The Court correctly reasoned that to
discriminate against a person because of their transgender status
necessarily requires discrimination based on their sex because a person
“intends to rely on sex.”153 The Court painted this reasoning with a
hypothetical:
Imagine an employer who has a policy of firing any employee known
to be homosexual. The employer hosts an office holiday party and
invites employees to bring their spouses. A model employee arrives
and introduces a manager to Susan, the employee’s wife. Will that
employee be fired? If the policy works as the employer intends, the
answer depends entirely on whether the model employee is a man or a
woman.154

The same logic applies to transgender persons. If one’s goal is to discriminate
against another solely due to their transgender status, their choice to
discriminate necessarily depends on the individual’s sex because their
transgender status stems from their biological sex. Even under this strict
definition, the Court concluded that discrimination against transgender
individuals is included under Title VII’s “sex” prong.155

148

Id.
Id. at 1742.
150
See supra Part III.D.
151
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
152
Id. at 1741.
153
Id. at 1742.
154
Id.
155
Id.
149
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Applying the Bostock majority’s argument to the MHRA, it is
reasonable to conclude that transgender status should be, or perhaps
already is, protected under the MHRA. Anytime someone discriminates
against a person for their transgender status, they must necessarily rely on
that individual’s sex. As long as that discrimination is a motivating factor
in the discriminator’s adverse action, the discriminator has violated the
MHRA.

VI. CONCLUSION
The MHRA was enacted to protect groups of people who face
discrimination for reasons society has deemed counter-intuitive to the
function of a civilized nation.156 As the attitudes and morals of society
change over time, so should the law. While the Missouri legislature should
explicitly resolve this issue by integrating more protected classes into the
MHRA – like transgender persons – such action could take years, or it
could never happen at all. However, there are four possible reasons to find
that transgender persons should be or are already protected by the MHRA:
(1) discrimination against a transgender individual is discrimination
against their sex through sex stereotyping, which is a recognized claim;157
(2) the plain and ordinary meaning of “sex” includes transgender status;158
(3) there are multiple reasonable interpretations of “sex” that could include
transgenderism because the protection of this class is within the spirit of
the MHRA;159 or (4) discrimination based on transgender status
necessarily relies on that person’s sex, as found in Bostock.160
The success of a transgender individual’s claim of unjust
discrimination should not depend on whether they properly bootstrapped
their claim to “sex” in their pleadings. While allowing transgender people
to plead around the true issue is better than nothing, continuing to force
them to bootstrap their claims to falsely identified discrimination is only a
Band-Aid that temporarily covers up the larger issue that the transgender
community continues to face.

156

See supra Part III.B.
See Lampley, supra note 128, at 24.
158
See supra Part V.B.
159
See supra Part V.B.
160
See supra Part V.C.
157
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